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Establishing a Balance of Power: The Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act and the Franchisor as
Landlord
I. INTRODUCTION
The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (P.M.P.A.)1 was enacted
to strike a new and ostensibly fairer balance of power between
franchised retail gasoline distributors and their patron oil compa-
nies.2 Prior to passage of the Act, abuses against franchisees were
frequently reported.3 Due to disparities in bargaining power, some
franchisees felt that their contracts with the oil companies
amounted to contracts of adhesion." Thus the franchisors could
often obtain great flexibility within the contract regarding their
rights to end the franchise relationship, and termination became
an often used remedy for contract violations. Prior to passage of
the P.M.P.A. there was no uniform law from state to state guaran-
teeing the franchisees that the fruits of their hard labors and their
expectations for security would not be destroyed by a single arbi-
trary decision of the franchisor.
To remedy the perceived problems, Congress undertook to cre-
ate a more equitable balance of power. This was no easy task, for
the franchise agreements were often complex and multidimen-
sional. Nevertheless, Congress perservered in its efforts to correct
unfairness in the retail gasoline marketing industry, and after ten
1. Pub. L. No. 95-297, Title I §§ 101-106, 92 Stat. 322 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
2801-2806 (1978)).
2. S. REP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 873. The legislators stated that:
[tihe title prohibits a franchisor from terminating a franchise during the term of the
franchise agreement and from failing to renew the relationship at the expiration of
the franchise term, unless the termination or non-renewal is based upon a ground
specified or described in the legislation and is executed in accordance with the notice
requirements of the legislation. These provisions strike a balance between the at
times conflicting interests of the parties to the relationship.
Id. at 874. (emphasis added)
3. Id. at 875-76.
4. Id. at 876.
5. Several states did have legislation protective of the franchisee prior to the P.M.P.A.
In addition to the welfare of the franchisee, Congress was concerned that the "patchwork"
of laws protecting franchisees which had been instituted in several states might create seri-
ous problems in the fuel distribution and marketing systems of the nation. Id. at 877.
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years of debate passed the P.M.P.A.
The Act is relatively short, having only six sections, yet it is
complexly structured and consequently has generated much confu-
sion among attorneys litigating retail gasoline franchise issues. At
this writing, the Act has been in effect for five years. This is an
appropriate time to examine how the Act has been interpreted and
determine whether the P.M.P.A. has been successful in redefining
the balance of power between the parties to a franchise. This com-
ment will be limited to a discussion of this balance of power in one
of the most frequently litigated situations presenting highly com-
plex issues under the Act: the extent of the obligation of the
franchisor, acting as landlord, to renew the lease underlying the
franchise agreement. It will, therefore, focus on cases dealing with
franchise nonrenewals arising from a lease dispute between a
franchisor/landlord and a franchisee/lessee.
II. THE PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT
Although this comment will restrict itself to a discussion of sec-
tion 2802 of the Act regarding franchise nonrenewals arising out of
a lease dispute between franchisor/landlord and a franchisee/
lessee, a general understanding of Title I of the Act as a whole is
necessary to a full understanding of its parts. The legislative his-
tory of the Act reveals both the congressional purpose in enacting
the legislation and its awareness of the competing interests in-
volved in franchise relationships. While the purpose of the Act is
to protect franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory termination
or nonrenewal of their franchise agreements, the needs and con-
cerns of both parties are treated in the Act. It is true that, under
the Act, franchisees are protected from arbitrary or discriminatory
treatment at the hands of the franchisors. But while the Act re-
6. There are three titles in the P.M.P.A. Title I is entitled Franchise Protection. See
supra note 1. For a good survey of Title I see Finch, Judicial Interpretation of the Petro-
leum Marketing Practices Act: Strict Construction of Remedial Legislation, 37 Bus. LAW
141 (Nov. 1981). Also helpful to an understanding of the need for which the Act was cre-
ated, and the Act's provisions is: Comment, Retail Gasoline Franchise Terminations and
Nonrenewals Under Title I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 1980 DuKE L. J. 522.
Title II, entitled Octane Disclosure, requires refiners to test automotive gasoline to deter-
mine its octane rating. Pub. L. No. 95-297, Title II §§ 201-204, 92 Stat. 333 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2821-2824 (1982)). Title III, entitled Study of Subsidization of Motor Fuel Mar-
keting, prohibits the subsidization of motor fuel marketing operations with funds or services
coming from other petroleum related operations. Pub. L. No. 95-297, Title III § 301, 92 Stat.
337 (cbdified at 15 U.S.C. § 2841 (1982)).
7. See supra S. REP: No. 731, note 2.
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stricts the franchisor's use of power, in many ways it supports its
power so long as it acts within the guidelines established by the
Act.8
This awareness of competing interests is better evidenced by a
closer examination of the sections of the Act. The first section of
the Act defines those terms which have special relevance to the
Act.9 The second and third sections outline the substantive provi-
sions of the Act including the necessary grounds for a valid termi-
nation or nonrenewal of a franchise agreement 0 and the require-
ments for a trial franchise which is not restricted by the terms of
the Act.11 The next two sections respectively provide the require-
ments of notice' 2 and the provisions for enforcement of the
P.M.P.A.' 8 The last provision of the Act preempts state law in this
subject area. 4
It is the second section, 15 U.S.C. § 2802, which is the heart of
the Act. Its provisions define the degree of protection afforded the
franchise relationship. This section consists of a general prohibi-
tion subject to the exceptions following it."5
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(1) (1982), infra note 16. In his article, Finch, Judicial In-
terpretation of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act: Strict Construction of Remedial
Legislation, 37 Bus. LAW. 141 (Nov. 1981), Mr. Finch suggests that the Act was a legislative
compromise which may disappoint both franchisees and franchisors. Id. at 142-43.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (1982). Many of the definitions given in this section are both cru-
cial to an understanding of the Act and specific to its subject matter. For example, the
definition of franchise given in § 2801(1)(A) limits itself to the motor fuel industry thus
making the act wholly inapplicable to other types of franchise contracts.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (1982), infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2803 (1982). This section provides that both trial and interim
franchises are outside the scope of the P.M.P.A., and defines and distinguishes the two
franchise types. A trial franchise must begin no sooner than June 19, 1978, and extend for
no more than a year. It must also be contained in a writing which states: that it is a trial
franchise, the duration of the initial franchise term, the circumstances under which the
franchisor may terminate the relationship, and that section 2802 of the P.M.P.A. is inappli-
cable to that franchise. Interim franchises also must begin on or after June 19, 1978, and
may not exceed three years in length. They begin at the end of a prior existing franchise,
and the writing which comprises the agreement must include: that it is an interim franchise,
the duration of the agreement, and that the franchisor may fail to renew if in good faith and
in the normal course of business the franchisor decides to withdraw its motor fuel sales from
the relevant geographic area. It does require that the requirements of section
2802(b)(2)(E)(ii) and (iii) be observed. See infra note 19.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2804 (1982).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2805 (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2806 (1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(a) (1982):
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 2803 of this title, no
franchisor engaged in the sale, consignment, or distribution of motor fuel in com-
merce may-
(1) terminate any franchise (entered into or renewed on or after June 19, 1978)
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While section 2802(a) reveals the remedial intent of the statute
toward franchisees in its general disallowance of terminations and
nonrenewals, section 2802(b)(1)16 exhibits congressional concern
for the interests of the franchisors. Following the same pattern,
that of a blanket prohibition followed by exceptions, section
2802(b)(1) provides that the franchisor may terminate or fail to
renew a franchise so long as it meets the notice and substantive
requirements that follow. At first glance it appears that what was
given to the franchisee in 2802(a) is then taken away by
2802(b)(1), but, as the statute continues, it becomes evident that
the exceptions which follow cause those provisions to be far from
absolute. Among the valid grounds for franchise termination or
nonrenewal are the failure of the franchisee to comply with reason-
able and material provisions of the franchise, 17 failure of the fran-
chisee to make good faith efforts to carry out the franchise provi-
sions," the occurrence of an event which makes termination or
prior to the conclusion of the term, or the expiration date, stated in the
franchise; or
(2)fail to renew any franchise relationship (without regard to the date on which
the relevant franchise was entered into or renewed).
Id.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(1) (1982) provides:
[a]ny franchisor may terminate any franchise (entered into or renewed on or after
June 19, 1978) or may fail to renew any franchise relationship, if-
(A) the notification requirements of section 2804 of this title are met; and(B)
such termination is based upon a ground described in paragraph (2) or such
nonrenewal is based upon a ground described in paragraph (2) or (3).
Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(A) (1982) provides:
[f]or purposes of this subsection, the following are grounds for termination of a
franchise or nonrenewal of a franchise relationship:
(A) A failure by the franchisee to comply with any provision of the franchise,
which provision is both reasonable and of material significance to the franchise
relationship, if the franchisor first acquired actual or constructive knowledge of
such failure-
(i) not more than 120 days prior to the date on which notification of
termination or nonrenewal is given, if notification is given pursuant to
section 2804(a) of this title; or(ii) not more than 60 days prior to the
date on which notification of termination or nonrenewal is given, if less
than 90 days notification is given pursuant to section 2804(b)(1) of this
title.
Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(B) (1982) states the next ground for termination or
nonrenewal:
[a] failure by the franchisee to exert good faith efforts to carry out the provisions of
the franchise, if-
(i) the franchisee was apprised by the franchisor in writing of such failure and
was afforded a reasonable opportunity to exert good faith efforts to carry out
1984 PMPA: The Franchisor as Landlord
nonrenewal reasonable,19 a written agreement between the parties
to terminate or not to renew the franchise,2" or a decision by the
franchisor to remove itself from the relevant geographic marketing
area." Further exceptions applicable only to the prohibition
such provisions; and
(ii) such failure thereafter continued within the period which began not more
than 180 days before the date notification of termination or nonrenewal was
given pursuant to section 2804 of this title.
Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(C) (1982), provides for termination or non-renewal if it
happens that there is:
[t]he occurrence of an event which is relevant to the franchise relationship and as a
result of which termination of the franchise or nonrenewal of the franchise relation-
ship is reasonable, if such event occurs during the period the franchise is in effect and
the franchisor first acquired actual or constructive knowledge of such occurrence-
(i) not more than 120 days prior to the date on which notification of termina-
tion or nonrenewal is given, if notification is given pursuant to section 2804(a)
of this title; or
(ii) not more than 60 days prior to the date on which notification of termina-
tion or nonrenewal is given, if less than 90 days notification is given pursuant
to section 2804(b)(1) of this title.
Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(D) (1982), states termination or nonrenewal is permissible
where there is:
[a]n agreement, in writing, between the franchisor and the franchisee to terminate
the franchise or not to renew the franchise relationship, if-
(i) such agreement is entered into not more than 180 days prior to the date of
such termination or, in the case of nonrenewal, not more than 180 days prior to
the conclusion of the term, or the expiration date, stated in the franchise;
(ii) the franchisee is promptly provided with a copy of such agreement, to-
gether with-the summary statement described in section 2804(d) of this title;
and
(iii) within 7 days after the date on which the franchisee is provided a copy of
such agreement, the franchisee has not posted by certified mail a written no-
tice to the franchisor repudiating such agreement.
Id.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(E) (1982), provides that it is permissible to terminate or fail
to renew,
[i]n the case of any franchise entered into prior to June 19, 1978, and in the case of
any franchise entered into or renewed on or after such date (the term of which is 3
years or longer, or with respect to which the franchisee was offered a term of 3 years
or longer), a determination made by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal
course of business to withdraw from the marketing of motor fuel through retail out-
lets in the relevant geographic market area in which the marketing premises are lo-
cated, if-
(i) such determination-
(I) was made after the date such franchise was entered into or renewed,
and
(II) was based upon the occurrence of changes in relevant facts and cir-
cumstances after such date;
(ii) the termination or nonrenewal is not for the purpose of converting the
premises, which are the subject of the franchise, to operation by employees or
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against nonrenewal include a failure of the parties to agree to new
franchise provisions made by the franchisor in good faith and in
the normal course of business.2 2 The failure must not arise from
the franchisor's insistence on them solely to prevent the franchise
renewal.23 Also valid as grounds for nonrenewal are the existence of
numerous customer complaints against the franchisee's methods of
operation, 4 and the failure of the franchisee to operate the station
in a clean, safe, and healthful manner on at least three occasions of
which the franchisee has been notified.25 The final mentioned pro-
agents of the franchisor for such franchisor's own account; and
(iii) in the case of leased marketing premises-
(I) the franchisor, during the 180-day period after notification was given
pursuant to section 2804 of this title, either made a bona fide offer to
sell, transfer, or assign to the franchisee such franchisor's interest in
such premises, or, if applicable, offered the franchisee a right of first
refusal of at least 45 days duration of an offer, made by another, to
purchase such franchisor's interest in such premises; or
(II) in the case of the sale, transfer, or assignment to another person of
the franchisor's interest in such premises in connection with the sale,
transfer, or assignment to such other person of the franchisor's interest
in one or more other marketing premises, if such other person offers, in
good faith, a franchise to the franchisee on terms and conditions which
are not discriminatory to the franchisee as compared to franchises then
currently being offered by such other person or franchises then if effect
and with respect to which such other person is the franchisor.
Id.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A) (1982) provides: [fior purposes of this subsection, the
following are grounds for nonrenewal of a franchise relationship:
(A) The failure of the franchisor and the franchisee to agree to changes or
additions to the provisions of the franchise, if-
(i) such changes or additions are the result of determinations made by
the franchisor in good faith and in the normal course of business; and
(ii) such failure is not the result of the franchisor's insistence upon such
changes or additions for the purpose of preventing the renewal of the
franchise relationship.
Id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A)(ii) (1982) supra note 22.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(B) (1982), provides for nonrenewal in the event of:
[t]he receipt of numerous bona fide customer complaints by the franchisor concerning
the franchisee's operation of the marketing premises, if-
(i) the franchisee was promptly apprised of the existence and nature of such
complaints following receipt of such complaints by the franchisor; and
(ii) if such complaints related to the condition of such premises or to the con-
duct of any employee of such franchisee, the franchisee did not promptly take
action to cure or correct the basis of such complaints.
Id.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(C) (1982) makes nonrenewal permissible where there is
present: "[a] failure by the franchisee to operate the marketing premises in a clean, safe,
and healthful manner, if the franchisee failed to do so on two or more previous occasions
and the franchisor notified the franchisee of such failures." Id.
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vision permitting nonrenewal is quite complex and justifies special
attention. With restrictions as to time of original agreement and
duration of the franchise, it allows for nonrenewal where the
franchisor, in good faith and in the normal course of business,
wishes to convert the premises to a use other than the sale of mo-
tor fuel, renovate or replace the location, or sell the property, or
where the renewal of the franchise is likely to be financially unre-
warding despite any reasonable changes which could be made in
the agreement .2  With regard to the purposes of renovation or re-
placement of the premises, or where the relationship is economi-
cally disadvantageous, there are additional requirements which
must be met by the franchisor before a nonrenewal will be valid
under the Act. The first of these additional requirements is that
the franchise must not be allowed to expire just so that the agents
of the franchisor may replace the franchisee.17 The second of these
requirements applies only to leased marketing premises. 28 Where
such an arrangement exists the franchisor must, during the statu-
26. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(i) provides for nonrenewal:
[i]n the case of any franchise entered into prior to June 19, 1978, (the unexpired term
of which, on such date, is 3 years or longer) and in the case of any franchise entered
into or renewed on or after such date (the term of which was 3 years or longer, or
with respect to which the franchisee was offered a term of 3 years or longer), a deter-
mination made by the franchisor in good faith and in the normal course of business,
if-
(i) such determination is-
(I) to convert the leased marketing premises to a use other than the sale
or distribution of motor fuel,
(II) to materially alter, add to, or replace such premises,
(III) to sell such premises, or (IV) that renewal of the franchise relation-
ship is likely to be uneconomical to the franchisor despite any reasona-
ble changes or reasonable additions to the provisions of the franchise
which may be acceptable to the franchisee. .
Id.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(ii) (1982) states that nonrenewal is permissible if:
(ii) with respect to a determination referred to in subclause (III) or (IV), such deter-
mination is not made for the purpose of converting the leased marketing premises to
operation by employees or agents of the franchisor for such franchisor's own account.
Id.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii) (1982) also provides for nonrenewal if:
(iii) in the case of leased marketing premises such franchisor during the 90-day pe-
riod after notification was given pursuant to section 2804 of this title, either-
(I) made a bona fide offer to sell, transfer, or assign to the franchisee such
franchisor's interests in such premises; or
(II) if applicable, offered the franchisee a right of first refusal of at least 45-
days duration of an offer, made by another to purchase such franchisor's inter-
est in such premises.
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tory notice period defined in section 2804,29 either offer the fran-
chisee its interest in the property through sale, assignment or
transfer, or offer the franchisee a right of first refusal to purchase
the franchisor's interest in the premises.30
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PETROLEUM MARKETING
PRACTICES ACT
There are four possible situations under which the franchisee
can come into possession of the service station premises: (1) The
franchisee may own the marketing premises; (2) A third party may
own the marketing premises and rent directly to the franchisee; (3)
The franchisor may own the land and lease to the franchisee; and
(4) A third party owner may lease the premises to the franchisor
who then sublets to the franchisee. In only the third and fourth
situation is the franchisor also in the position of landlord. Conse-
quently, this discussion will be confined to those possibilities.
A. The Franchisor as Owner of the Premises
Examining first the situation where the franchisor owns the mar-
keting premises and leases to the franchisee, the ground most often
cited by the nonrenewing franchisors is the failure of the parties to
agree to new lease provisions.3 One of the earliest such cases is
Pearman v. Texaco, Inc.32 From the Pearman decision it would
appear that although the franchise relationship is afforded some
protection under the P.M.P.A., the individual features of the
agreement are not protected and can be unilaterally changed by
the franchisor at the renewal negotiations.33 The unilateral change
made by the franchisor in Pearman was the amount of the rent
required under the franchise/lease agreement.3 4 After Mr. Pearman
failed to agree to the new rent proposal, Texaco sent plaintiff no-
tice that it intended to cancel plaintiff's lease.3 5 Subsequently the
franchise expired and Mr. Pearman filed suit seeking a preliminary
injunction.36 His theory was that Texaco's nonrenewal was not the
result of a decision made in good faith and in the normal course of
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A) (1982).
32. 480 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
33. Id. at 768.
34. Id. at 768-69.
35. Id. at 769.
36. Id. at 770.
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business, but that Texaco had insisted upon the rental changes so
that they might prevent the renewal of the franchise relationship.3 7
The court found that the evidence submitted supported Texaco's
assertion that the change in the rental structure was made in the
normal course of business and in good faith.3 8 In short, the defen-
dant had met the burden of proving compliance with the Act 39 and
had thus removed itself from the general prohibition against non-
renewal contained in the broad provision of section 2802(a)(2).' °
The case of Munno v. Amoco Oil Co.4' also arose as the result of
the failure of lease renewal negotiations. Following notice that the
lease would expire, the plaintiff refused to move from the leased
premises. 2 As a result, Amoco instituted eviction proceedings
against Munno, who then filed a complaint against Amoco alleging
that its actions violated the P.M.P.A.4 Specifically, Munno alleged
that the rental increase demanded was unreasonable and that ac-
ceptance of it would force him from his business.
44
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that under the stat-
ute45 the franchisor is required to show that it has acted in good
faith and in the normal course of business, and that the failure did
not result from any demands of the franchisor for the purpose of
preventing the renewal.
46
In Munno, the plaintiff asserted that objective good faith was
called for and that as a result questions of reasonableness were in-
volved.'7 The court, however, disagreed with plaintiff's analysis of
the good faith requirement and found that it was a matter of sub-
jective intent rather than objective result.48 After finding support
in the legislative history the court concluded that the reasonable-
ness test was specifically rejected by Congress, and that the inter-
pretation of good faith as a subjective state of mind was what Con-
gress intended when it passed the Act.49 It is interesting to note
37. Id. at 768.
38. Id. at 771. The good faith and normal course of business standard is taken from 15
U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A)(i) (1982), see supra note 24.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A) (1982), supra note 22.
40. See supra note 15.
41. 488 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Conn. 1980).
42. Id. at 1117.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A) (1982).
46. 488 F. Supp. at 1117-18.
47. Id. at 1118.
48. Id. at 1120.
49. Id. at 1118-19.
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that although the court stated that objective evidence of the sub-
jective state of mind is appropriate,50 it did not then consider the
plaintiff's allegation of unreasonableness as an indication of the
state of mind present in the case before it.
51
Rental rates are again the basis for controversy in Ferriola v.
Gulf Oil Corp.52 After numerous proposals by Gulf and a counter
proposal by Ferriola, the parties were unable to agree to a new
monthly rent in their lease renewal negotiations.5 3 The plaintiff
filed suit alleging that Gulf was deliberately offering renewal at an
unacceptably high monthly rental rate in order to drive him from
his business.54 The court, in the face of evidence supporting the
plaintiff's assertion, gave controlling weight to the fact that Gulf
made its offers pursuant to a rental policy which was not itself in-
valid.55 Having so found, the court then examined the good faith
question in the light of the objective facts of the case. The court
relied on the facts that the rental policy was applied no more
harshly to Ferriola than to the other franchisees and that Gulf
made efforts to maintain the franchise relationship with him. 6 As
a result of the court's findings, no relief was available to plaintiff
for the loss of his franchise. The case made clear that the
franchisor's duty to bargain in good faith implied under the stat-
ute57 does not require the franchisor to offer a franchise package
acceptable to the individual franchisee.
The notion that reasonableness and good faith are separate con-
cepts, which was introduced in Munno, was reinforced by two
cases involving the same defendant and the same rental formula.5 8
The earlier of the two cases was Tiller v. Amerada Hess.59 It in-
volved a request for a preliminary injunction 0 to prevent the im-
50. Id. at 1121.
51. Id. at 1120-21. Mr. Munno did not submit evidence on this point but it is interest-
ing to surmise whether if given proof that an unreasonable result such as financial ruin was
inevitable, this court would have considered it as objective evidence of subjective bad faith
and come to a decision favorable to the plaintiff.
52. 496 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
53. Id. at 159-60.
54. Id. at 159.
55. Id. at 162.
56. Id. at 163.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A) (1982).
58. Tiller v. Amerada Hess, 540 F. Supp. 160 (D.S.C. 1981); Myer v. Amerada Hess,
541 F. Supp. 321 (D.N.J. 1982).
59. 540 F. Supp. 160 (D.S.C. 1981).
60. To gain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show a reasonable chance
of prevailing on the merits at trial, and also that failure to issue an injunction will cause
greater damage to the plaintiff than issuance will cause the defendant. Id. at 166.
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plementation of a rent increase in the franchises of the several
plaintiffs involved."' As in Ferriola, the plaintiffs alleged that the
proposed rent increase had not been made in good faith, but that
it was an excuse to terminate6 2 certain franchise agreements. The
court considered and rejected reasonableness as a test for the va-
lidity of a nonrenewal. 63
Instead, the court asserted that questions of subjective intent
are proper issues for the jury and that they are matters of infer-
ence to be derived from all of the objective facts." Although this
analysis adds little to the treatment of reasonableness made in
Munno, it is an important case in that it is proof that subjective
bad faith can be found based upon the same objective facts that
would support the assertion of unreasonableness.
In the later decision, Myer v. Amerada Hess, 5 the case involved
a plaintiff who had already signed a lease agreement under the new
rental formula. Despite the lack of an actual failure to renew the
franchise, the court found that it had jurisdiction to decide
whether the allegations stated a cause of action on which the court
could grant relief.66 Summary judgment was granted to the defen-
dants on a finding that their rental rates were made and offered to
the plaintiff in good faith.17 It is noteworthy that in this case the
court made no express distinction between reasonableness and
good faith, and even used the terms interchangeably at one point.68
The different results in Tiller and Myer would seem to be due to a
difference in the quality of evidence submitted,6 9 rather than each
court's treatment of the good faith issue. It is clear that in all the
above cases where the franchisor is the owner of the marketing
premises, the only duties which the courts will impose under the
61. Id. at 162.
62. Id. Although the word termination is used in the court's discussion of reasonable-
ness in its conclusions of law, it is clear that it is nonrenewal which is threatened in this
case. Id. at 163, 165.
63. Id. at 165.
64. Id.
65. 541 F. Supp. 321 (D.N.J. 1982).
66. Id. at 329.
67. Id. at 331.
68. Id. at 330. The court stated that "[i]n the present case the evidence produced by
Hess demonstrates that Hess devised the new rental formula in good faith for sound busi-
ness reasons and in the normal course of its business. The formula has every appearance of
being reasonable viewed in the light of Hess' over-all operations." Id.
69. It is undeniable that the concept of reasonableness is treated more favorably in
Myer. Where Tiller rejects it as a concept not embraced by Congress, Myer implicitly ap-
proaches it as an objective indication of subjective good faith.
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Act are those which are expressly stated within the Act.
While the components of good faith are never expressly detailed,
the Senate Report which accompanied the Act stated that the good
faith and normal course of business standard was designed to pro-
tect the franchisee from arbitrary or discriminatory termination or
nonrenewal.7 0 This would seem to indicate that the absence of ar-
bitrary action or discriminatory motives are the essentials of good
faith under the Act. Given this narrow interpretation of good faith,
together with the courts' reticence to expand protection beyond
the specific language of the Act, it becomes evident that there is
very little protection afforded the franchisee from the risk of
nonrenewal.
The case of Kesselman v. Gulf Oil Co., 7 1 also involved a dispute
over rental structures in the lease between the franchisee and the
franchisor. Although this lease was dependent upon an underlying
lease between the franchisor and a third party owner 72 the nature
of the dispute places it more naturally with the cases involving a
franchisor owner.7 The plaintiff had refused to sign a new lease at
the rates offered by Gulf and requested a preliminary injunction
which would order Gulf to maintain its relationship with him.
74
The court used the good faith standard embodied in section
2802(b)(3)(A)" of the P.M.P.A. and concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to carry the burden of proof that there existed "suffi-
ciently serious questions going to the merits to make such ques-
tions a fair ground for litigation.
' '7
1
The good faith standard used here is the same as that used
where the franchisor is the owner of the premises, and rightly so,
since in both cases the dispute is over the terms of the renewal
70. S. RmP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 895-96.
71. 479 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 624 F.2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1979).
72. Id. at 801.
73. The disagreement between Kesselman and Gulf concerned the terms of the re-
newal lease which was offered and, therefore, resolution of the dispute required an interpre-
tation of section 2802(b)(3)(A), supra note 22. This is the same cause for dispute and the
same section of the P.M.P.A. which has been discussed above in the cases dealing with
direct leases between franchisors and franchisees. The cases which will be discussed below
will involve a sublease between franchisor and franchisee just as does Kesselman. However,
they will differ in that the grounds for dispute will be the franchisor's failure to renew the
underlying lease between itself and a third party. The resolution of these disputes will thus
require an interpretation of section 2802(b)(2)(C), supra note 16.
74. 479 F. Supp. at 801.
75. See supra note 22.
76. 479 F. Supp. at 804.
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lease which is offered in negotiations to the franchisee hoping to
renew his franchise agreement. This case, in light of those ex-
amined previously, indicates that it is the nature of the dispute
rather than the details of the relationship which indicates applica-
tion of one section of the P.M.P.A. rather than another.
B. The Franchisee as Sublessee from the Franchisor Lessee
A somewhat more complicated set of problems can arise where
the franchisor holds the marketing premises under a lease from a
third party and sublets the land to the franchisee. Very often the
controversy will arise as the result of the failure of the underlying
lease. This situation has been the subject of some very interesting
litigation.
It has often been the failure of the franchisor to take affirmative
action to renew the underlying lease which has prompted the fran-
chisee to file suit under the P.M.P.A. Such a situation was the fo-
cus of litigation in Gaspar v. Chevron Oil Co. 77 The underlying
lease between the property owner and the franchisor was allowed
to expire, and the franchisor did not take action to prevent the
expiration by exercising an option which the franchisor held.78 Al-
though the plaintiff was able to negotiate a direct lease with the
property owner, he was able to do so only at a substantial cost to
himself which he sought to recover from Chevron.7 9 The substance
of the franchisee's complaint was that it was wrong for the
franchisor to keep its possession of the option a secret from him,
and that the franchisor had a duty to exercise the option so that
the franchise could continue.80 The franchisor asserted that it had
an affirmative defense under the Act: that an event relevant to the
franchise relationship had occurred, and that as a result of that
event nonrenewal was reasonable.81 Definitions under the Act spe-
cifically state that failure of the underlying lease constitutes just
such an event.8 2 This section protects the franchisor's right not to
77. 490 F. Supp. 971 (D.N.J. 1980).
78. Id. at 973.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(C) (1982).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(c)(4) (1982), provides that:
[a]s used in subsection (b)(2)(C) of this section, the term "an event which is relevant
to the franchise relationship and as a result of which determination of the franchise
or nonrenewal of the franchise relationship is reasonable" includes events such as-
(4) loss of the franchisor's right to grant possession of the leased marketing
premises through expiration of an underlying lease, if the franchisee was noti-
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renew where the franchisor has lost the right to grant possession of
the property because of the expiration of the underlying lease."3
The court noted that Congress had foreseen this very circumstance
and had expressly condoned the failure to exercise an option which
resulted in expiration of the underlying lease.8 4 Using the legisla-
tive history as a guide to interpretation, the court could find no
duty to disclose the presence of the option, or to exercise it, ex-
pressed in the P.M.P.A.5 Summary judgment was granted in favor
of the franchisor.8
Ricco v. Shell Oil Co.,8 7 like Gaspar, arose from a dispute over
the franchisor's failure to exercise an option to renew the underly-
ing lease.8 8 The Superior Court of New Jersey, in summary fashion,
concluded that since section 280289 allows nonrenewal of a
franchise following the loss of the franchisor's right to grant pos-
session of the marketing premises, there is no affirmative duty de-
fined by the P.M.P.A. which would require the franchisor to nego-
tiate a new lease where the prior lease ends of its own terms.90
A slightly different situation was presented in Lugar v. Texaco,91
with very different results. There the franchisor held an option to
buy the premises or to renew the lease. 2 Prior to the expiration of
the underlying lease the franchisee had requested that the option
to buy the premises be assigned to him.93 Texaco failed to assign or
exercise the option." Following the franchisee's instigation of suit
fled in writing, prior to the commencement of the term of the then existing
franchise-
(A) of the duration of the underlying lease, and
(B) of the fact that such underlying lease might expire and not be re-
newed during the term of such franchise (in the case of termination) or
at the end of such term (in the case of nonrenewal)..
Id.
83. Id.
84. 490 F. Supp. at 974.
85. The legislative history indicates that there is no duty to exercise an option to re-
new an underlying lease. See, S. REP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38; reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 896.
86. 490 F. Supp. at 975.
87. 180 N.J. Super. 399, 434 A.2d 1151 (1981).
88. Id. at 402, 434 A.2d at 1154.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (1982). The Ricco court refers to section 102 of the P.M.P.A., 180
N.J. Super. at 403, 434 A.2d at 1153. This is a reference to the section of the Act itself which
corresponds to 15 U.S.C. § 2802 as codified.
90. 180 N.J. Super. at 406, 434 A.2d at 1154.
91. No. 81-2021 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1982).
92. Id. at 1-2.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.
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against it under the P.M.P.A., the franchisor attempted to defend
its actions, asserting that nonrenewal was justified because the fail-
ure of the underlying lease was an event, the occurrence of which
made nonrenewal reasonable.96
The court refused to accept this argument, holding that the pro-
visions of the P.M.P.A. did not provide a defense for Texaco be-
cause, although at the time the franchisee requested that the op-
tion be assigned to him, Texaco had the power to grant possession
to Lugar in the form of the option, it had instead triggered a situa-
tion where the franchise relationship could not continue.96 In addi-
tion, the court found that only improper motives could have
caused Texaco not to assign the option.97 Having found that Tex-
aco failed to renew the franchise without any permissible grounds
for nonrenewal under the P.M.P.A., the court entered judgment for
the franchisee.98
The basic question of whether franchisors have an affirmative
duty to negotiate renewal leases with the landowners so that the
subleases of the franchisees can continue has elicited unanimous
negative responses from the courts. In Bernardini v. Exxon,e9 it
was made clear that the loss of the underlying lease, which makes
franchise nonrenewal reasonable, 00 is not limited to involuntary
loss, but applies with equal force where the franchisor in his legiti-
mate business judgment decides to allow the lease to lapse. 01 It
was also stated that the provisions of the several sections of the
Act are completely separate so that the requirements for nonre-
newal stated in one provision cannot be assumed to apply to other
sections of the Act.1
0 2
The later case of Brungardt v. Amoco Oil Co.10 3 echoed the
Bernardini decision in holding that the expiration of a franchisor's
underlying lease may be intentional and still qualify as a loss.'"'
Implied in these decisions is the idea that the underlying reason
for the franchisor's decision not to renew the lease does not deter-
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2802(b)(2)(C) and 2802(c)(4) (1982). See supra notes 21 and 82.
96. No. 81-2021, slip op. at 4-5.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 6-7.
99. [1981-1 Trade Cas.] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 63,921, at 75,770 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(C). See supra note 19.
101. [1981-1 Trade Cas.] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 63,921 at 75,772-73 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
102. Id. at 75,773.
103. 530 F. Supp. 744 (D. Kan. 1982).
104. Id. at 747.
1984
Duquesne Law Review
mine the applicability of sections 2802(b)(2)(C) and 2802(c)(4). 105
Even affirmative steps taken to terminate an otherwise self re-
newing underlying lease have been found to come within the mean-
ing of loss as it is used in section 2802(c)(4).106 The ultimate disap-
pointment to a franchisee in hope of protection under the
P.M.P.A. came in Veracka v. Shell Oil Co. 10 7 In Veracka the un-
derlying lease agreement between the owner and Shell Oil had an
automatic extension provision from year to year which would oper-
ate in the absence of any notice of discontinuance from Shell. 08
Shell did decide to discontinue the lease and wrote to the owner
giving notice of its desire to do so.' The franchisee in his suit
against Shell stated that although Shell could passively allow the
lease to expire, the loss under section 2802(c)(4) would not apply if
the franchisor took affirmative steps to end the underlying lease." 0
The court, however, did not agree and failed to see a significant
difference between an affirmative act ending a lease and a passive
failure to exercise an option to renew."' Under this reasoning even
deliberate action by the franchisor leading inevitably to franchise
nonrenewal was held to be allowed under the Act."
2
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of these cases shows that current majority judi-
cial interpretation of the P.M.P.A. has not provided the franchisee
any guarantees of lease renewal. Whether the franchisor owns the
land and directly leases to the franchisee, or whether the fran-
chisee has a sublease from the franchisor, there must be grounds
for nonrenewal present as listed under sections 2802(b)(2)" 5 or
2802(b)(3), ' 4 before franchise nonrenewal can occur. The cases
105. See supra notes 19 and 82. The plaintiff argued that the reason the lease was
allowed to expire was that the lease franchise arrangement was unprofitable for the
franchisor. As a result, he insisted that the franchisor had an obligation to offer to sell,
transfer, or assign its interest in the property under § 2802(b)(3)(D)(i)(IV). See supra note
26. Although the court nowhere disagreed that this was the true reason for the franchisor's
failure to renew the underlying lease, the court held that 2802(b)(2)(C) controlled. 530 F.
Supp. at 746-47.
106. Veracka v. Shell Oil Co., 655 F.2d 445, 448 (lst Cir. 1981).
107. 655 F.2d at 445.
108. Id. at 446.
109. Id. at 447.
110. Id. at 448.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 17-21.
114. See supra notes 22-28.
Vol. 22:707
PMPA: The Franchisor as Landlord
show that the lease agreement may be just as crucial to the contin-
uance of the franchisee's business as the franchise agreement itself.
Indeed the direct lease is afforded the same protection as the
franchise agreement since under the definition of section
2801(1)(B)(i)" 5 the lease is a part of the franchise agreement.
The courts have afforded no direct protection for an underlying
lease agreement between the franchisor and landowner upon which
the franchisee's lease and, consequently, franchise agreements de-
pend. The problem with considering the underlying lease to be
part of the franchise, as is the direct lease, is that the underlying
lease involves a contractual relationship between the franchisor
and a third party. Ostensibly this relationship is separate from the
franchisee's affiliation with the franchisor. Congressional legisla-
tion regulating these activities would most likely violate the consti-
tutional right of freedom to contract.
There are easier and more realistic approaches which could be
effected without the creation of more laws. The current broad in-
terpretation of the exceptions permitting nonrenewal are not re-
quired either by" the language of the statute or by the legislative
history. Remedy could be found in a more strict interpretation by
the judiciary of section 2804(c)(4) which would interpret "loss" to
include only involuntary losses, and passive voluntary losses for
which there is a demonstrated good faith reason for the failure to
renew. In no instance should the word "loss" be stretched in its
meaning to include the active termination of an underlying lease
by the franchisor. While the bulk of the cases to date indicate that
a mechanical application of the statutes can be expected, still a
case such as Lugar is a sign that some courts are willing to look at
individual cases in a more analytic and thoughtful manner.
Sublessees could also be afforded greater protection while still
staying within the intent of the legislative authors by the applica-
tion of a good faith standard to all franchise nonrenewals. 1 6 Con-
gress intended the Act to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory ter-
mination or nonrenewal of franchise agreements.11 7 As set forth in
Munno, Tiller and Myer, good faith is merely the subjective em-
115. Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(A) (1982). This is not to suggest that the good faith stan-
dard expressly stated in section 2802(b)(3)(A)(i) applies to the entire Act since it is clear
that that requirement is a consideration only where the franchisor and franchisee fail to
agree to changes or additions to the 2802(b)(3)(A) franchise provisions. See supra note 22.




bodiment of the intent not to be arbitrary or discriminatory.1 8
Therefore it is completely within the legislative intent to impute
such a good faith standard to all acts by the franchisor resulting in
a nonrenewal of the franchise.
While there are viable political and business philosophies which
may object to the imposition of governmental restrictions upon
private contractual obligations, the P.M.P.A. is law. As remedial
legislation it acknowledges the weight of power enjoyed by the oil
companies and attempts to strike a new balance of power. While
the P.M.P.A. cannot be construed to put the parties on a par with
one another, it should be construed consistent with its intention to
put the franchisee into a viable bargaining position. Unfortunately,
current judicial interpretation has not done this where underlying
leases exist.
Janet A. Sheehan
118. Myer v. Amerada Hess, 541 F. Supp. 321 (D.N.J. 1982); Tiller v. Amerada Hess,
540 F. Supp. 160 (D.S.C. 1981); Munno v. Amoco Oil Co., 488 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Conn.
1980).
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